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Abstract. User authentication and the verification of online transac-
tions that are performed on an untrusted computer or device is an im-
portant and challenging problem. This paper presents an approach to
authentication and transaction verification using a trusted mobile de-
vice, equipped with a camera, in conjunction with QR codes. The mo-
bile device does not require an active connection (e.g., Internet or cellular
network), as the required information is obtained by the mobile device
through its camera, i.e. solely via the visual channel. The proposed ap-
proach consists of an initial user authentication phase, which is followed
by a transaction verification phase. The transaction verification phase
provides a mechanism whereby important transactions have to be veri-
fied by both the user and the server. We describe the adversarial model
to capture the possible attacks to the system. In addition, this paper
analyzes the security of the propose scheme, and discusses the practical
issues and mechanisms by which the scheme is able to circumvent a va-
riety of security threats including password stealing, man-in-the-middle
and man-in-the-browser attacks. We note that our technique is applicable
to many practical applications ranging from standard user authentica-
tion implementations to protecting online banking transactions.
Keywords.Authentication; Mobile Device; One-Time-Password (OTP);
QR Code; Transaction-Authentication-Number (TAN); Transaction In-
tegrity; Transaction Verification
1 Introduction
User authentication and the verification of online transactions in Internet based
services is an important issue that has received much attention by researchers
and practitioners alike. Addressing the security concern surrounding user au-
thentication and online transactions is essential considering the extensive use
of computers and electronic devices in our everyday life. Moreover, with the
increasing number and variety of malicious threats such as phishing, Trojans,
key-loggers, etc. many transactions are conducted on untrustworthy computers
or devices.
In addition, not only are the conventional approaches to authentication, like
the traditional username and password login approach, susceptible to password
stealing attacks, the increasing number of online services means that a person
either has to remember a large number of different passwords or compromise
on the security by using the same password for multiple services. As such, over
the years a large variety of different authentication schemes have been proposed
and studied [2, 3]. For example, a number of schemes have proposed the use of
One-Time-Passwords (OTPs) to prevent attacks like key-logging and phishing
[14], Short-Message-Service (SMS) based OTP schemes [29], as well as others
like two, or three, factor authentication [8, 13].
However, while these schemes are useful, they are not necessarily secure. For
instance, SMS-based OTP schemes rely on the security of the cellular network.
Mulliner et al. [22] have contented that SMS OTP schemes cannot be consid-
ered to be secure, as researchers have shown several successful attacks against
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and 3G networks [1, 12, 19].
Furthermore, it has been argued that two, or three, factor authentication does
not overcome man-in-the-middle and Trojan attacks [10, 26, 27].
This paper investigates the challenging problem of user authentication and
transaction verification on an untrusted computer or device. We define trans-
action verification as encompassing both transaction authentication (i.e. the
transaction was indeed performed by the user) and transaction integrity (i.e.
the transaction has not been altered). In this paper, we present an approach
that uses a personal trusted mobile device, with the requirement that the mobile
device has a camera. This is a reasonable requirement that does not overburden
the user, as nowadays personal mobile devices are common place and many indi-
viduals already own and use personal mobile devices like smartphones every day.
Moreover, in our approach the user does not have to remember any passwords,
except for the passcode used to login to the mobile device. In fact, some devices
allow for other login methods like biometrics.
Unlike a number of other camera-based mobile phone approaches [11, 20, 23,
29], our approach does not require the mobile device to have an active connection
(e.g., connection to the computer, cellular network, or Internet), all required
information is obtained by the mobile device’s camera via the visual channel
using QR codes. As such, our approach does not suffer from lost of connection
problems (e.g., losing Internet connection within a building, no roaming services
when bringing the phone to another country, etc.) and does not require the user
to establish a connection (e.g., Bluetooth) with, or install any special software
on, the computer.
In principle, our approach does not specifically require the use of QR codes
per se; any method of transferring the required data to the mobile device will
suffice. We adopt the QR code approach as it is a convenient and widespread
method of communication via the visual channel. One should also note that
in our approach the device does not have to be a mobile phone; it can be any
trusted mobile device with a camera, e.g., a tablet computer, or even a specialized
security token.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we present the design of an authentication
and verification approach for online transactions on untrusted devices, using a
trusted camera-based mobile device in conjunction with QR codes. Our approach
is separated into two phases; the user authentication phase and the transaction
verification phase. In the user authentication phase, an OTP is obtained by the
mobile device. The OTP is only valid for a single session, thus circumvent pass-
word stealing or replay attacks. After user authentication, important transac-
tions are verified using a Transaction-Authentication-Number (TAN). The user
can verify that the transaction information is accurate and the server can verify
that the transaction came from the user. This is to prevent session hijacking
attacks after user authentication. This paper analyzes the security and discusses
the practical issues as well as the drawbacks of the proposed approach. The
scheme described in this paper is applicable to many practical applications rang-
ing from standard user authentication to protecting online banking transactions.
2 Related Work
Over the years, there has been a lot of work in the area of authentication and
transaction verification. Researchers have proposed a variety of different schemes,
that rely on diverse mechanisms to secure transactions. A number of key research
efforts that are related to the scheme proposed in this paper are described in
this section. We roughly organize them here into a number of categories; namely,
SMS-based, token-based, connection-based, camera-based and QR code-based
approaches. However, it should be noted that many of the approaches overlap
and are not confined to a single category.
2.1 Authentication Methods
SMS-based Sun et al. [29] describe oPass, an SMS-based authentication method
of using a cellphone. During the registration phase of this approach, a user reg-
isters an account ID and a phone number. The user will also setup a long-term
password for generating a chain of OTPs for subsequent logins. To access an
online service, the user enters his/her ID into an untrusted web browser. The
user then opens the oPass program on his/her phone and enters the long-term
password. The program will generate an OTP that is sent via SMS directly to the
server, which verifies the user’s identity based on the SMS. Similar approaches
have also been proposed in other work [15] and there are numerous approaches
where OTPs are sent to the user’s cellphone via SMS [2, 3].
Token-based The use of security tokens are another approach to authentica-
tion. Tokens can be in the form of a physical device like a smart card or even
a mobile phone. For example, RSA SecurID [25] is a approach where a security
token is used to generate authentication codes at certain time intervals based on
an initial seed value. However, it has been highlighted that this approach does
not defend against session hijacking or online phishing [11]. Li et al. [17] pro-
pose a low-cost hardware token based PIN/TAN system for protecting e-banking
systems. This hardware takes the form of a physical USB token that has to be
inserted into an untrusted computer to perform user/server/transaction authen-
tication.
Connection-based MP-Auth [20] is an approach that relies on a trusted per-
sonal device to perform cryptographic computations. It requires a pre-established
long-term password to be shared between the user and the server. To protect the
password, password information is entered into the personal device instead of the
untrusted terminal. For this to happen, MP-Auth needs a connection between
the personal device and the computer, because cryptographic computations that
are performed on the personal device are sent to the computer, which in turn
forwards it to the server [20].
The Phoolproof phishing prevention system [23] is cellphone based approach
that uses public key cryptography in conjunction with a username/password
combination and an SSL connection. For the approach to work, a connection
must be established between the trusted cellphone and the untrusted browser. A
user who wishes to access an online account must always initiate the connection
using a secure bookmark stored in the cellphone, and the cellphone will direct
the browser to the associated URL [23].
Camera-based Clarke et al. [6] propose a camera-based authentication ap-
proach that requires a specialized device to perform constant monitoring of the
user’s interaction with an untrusted computer, by monitoring the information
displayed on the computer’s screen. The aim of the approach is to detect whether
information displayed on the computer’s screen has been tampered with. The
required monitoring in this method can be rather computationally intensive.
Chow et al. [4] describe a visual OTP challenge-response authentication ap-
proach that is based on visual cryptography. The secret authentication message
is split into two visual cryptography shares. Using the mobile device’s camera,
the user visual obtains the secret by overlaying one share on the mobile device’s
screen with the other share that is displayed on the computer’s screen. Another
method of authentication via the visual channel was demonstrated by McCune et
al. [21]. Their approach is focused on authentication between two devices rather
than an online service.
Cronto [7] is a commercial transaction authentication system for online bank-
ing transactions. The system uses a patented visual transaction signing approach
in which a graphical cryptogram, a CrontoSign image, is displayed on a user’s
computer screen. The user uses a camera phone or a dedicated hardware device
to capture the cryptogram. Transaction information can be securely decoded
from the cryptogram if the image is untampered. The user is to check the trans-
action details and confirm that the transaction is genuine. An authentication
code is then generated on the user’s phone or device and the user has to pass
this back to the bank’s server to complete a transaction [7].
QR code-based Snap2pass, and its extension Snap2pay, is a QR code-based
approach which requires a camera cellphone to have an active connection [11].
To login to a website, the server sends a QR code, which encodes a crypto-
graphic challenge, to the browser. The user is to take a picture of the QR code
with his/her camera cellphone. After the cellphone performs the necessary cryp-
tographic computations, it sends a cryptographic response directly back to the
server. Upon receiving a valid response, the server then logs the user in through
the browser.
Starnberger et al. [27] describe QR-TAN, a transaction authentication method
based on QR codes and a trusted mobile device. In QR-TAN, a shared secret
key must be pre-arranged between the mobile device and the server. In addition,
it uses public key cryptography where the private key is stored in the mobile
device and the untrusted computer has access to the public key. To perform a
transaction, a nonce is requested from the server. The untrusted computer then
encrypts transaction information and the nonce using the mobile device’s public
key and displayed the result as a QR code. The mobile device scans the QR
code to obtain the encrypted information, which it is required to decrypt using
its private key. It then computes a hash based on the transaction information,
the nonce, and whether the user approves or rejects the transaction. Part of this
hash is sent as a TAN to the server, which computes its own approve and reject
hash values, and tries to match these with the value computed on the mobile
device.
In addition to the approaches described above, there are various other pro-
posed QR code authentication schemes [18, 24, 28, 30].
2.2 The QR Code
The QR code is a two-dimensional code that was invented by the company Denso
Wave [9]. Its widespread adoption in many different applications is due to its
convenience and ease of use. Any device equipped with a camera and QR code
reader can retrieve the information encoded within a QR code. Other than for
authentication, QR codes have been used for a variety of security applications
including secret sharing [5] and digital watermarking [16]. While our approach
does not specifically require the use of QR codes, as any method that is able
to pass data to the mobile device will suffice, we chose to adopt the QR code
because of its intuitiveness.
3 System and Adversarial Models
In this section, we describe our system and adversarial models that will be used
to analyze the security of our proposed scheme.
3.1 System Model
The system consists of the following entities: end users who are equipped with
a mobile device that holds the user’s long-term secret information such as pass-
words or cryptographic keys; a transaction server that the users will connect to
for online transactions; and a public computer that will be used by the user to
interact with the server via the Internet.
We assume that the mobile device is equipped with a camera but does not
have any network connection (i.e., it is a stand alone device). The mobile device
can only communicate with the computer via the visual channel using QR codes.
The computer can connect to the transaction server through the Internet. In
this paper, we assume that the computer is public such that any user, including
malicious attackers, can access it and install any (possibly malicious) software on
it. The transaction server will process any connection request from the Internet,
including those initiated by malicious attackers.
Without losing generality, we also assume a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
is in place where users and the transaction server can obtain Digital Certificates
from a trusted Certification Authority (CA).
3.2 Adversarial Model
Based on the system model described above, we present our adversarial model.
We assume that the transaction server and the mobile device of an honest user
are trusted, which means attackers cannot access any secret information main-
tained by the mobile device or the transaction server. However, attackers can
corrupt the public computer and install any software (e.g., key-logger) on it. In
addition, an attacker can use the compromised computer to communicate with
the mobile device via the visual channel and the transaction server through the
Internet.
We also assume that an attacker, via the compromised computer, can access
and record any user input from peripherals (such as keyboard, mouse, etc.)
as well as any traffic generated in an online transaction between the user and
the transaction server. Furthermore, during an online transaction, an attacker
can modify the data exchanged between the user and the server through the
compromised computer.
Security Goals. It is obvious that given an untrusted computer described
above, we are unable to achieve security against certain attacks, such as the De-
nial of Service attack or the eavesdropping attack since we assume the attacker
can directly control the network communication and monitor any transaction
performed by the user. Therefore, in this paper we mainly focus on the secu-
rity goals related to the integrity and authenticity of the online transactions.
Specifically, we require the following security properties to be preserved with
overwhelming probabilities.
– User authentication. We require that without the cooperation of the user
(and the mobile device), an attacker who controls the compromised computer
cannot successfully impersonate the user against the transaction server, given
that the attacker can access all the previous user communication transcripts.
– Transaction authentication. Without the involvement of the user (and the
mobile device), the attacker cannot successfully perform an online transac-
tion with the server, given that the attacker can access all the previous user
transactions.
– Transaction integrity. The attacker cannot modify any transaction data ex-
changed between the user and the transaction server without being detected.
4 The Proposed Scheme
The proposed approach addresses the problem of authenticating the user and
verifying online transactions using two phases; namely, an initial user authen-
tication phase and the transaction verification phase. During the user authen-
tication phase the untrusted computer establishes an SSL connection with the
server; information is exchanged between the server and the mobile device via
the untrusted computer, and if certain conditions are met, the server will be able
to authenticate that it is indeed communicating with the correct user.
After the user authentication phase, any important transactions made by
the user will have to be verified by both the user and the server. This is to
prevent any tampering by an attacker who manages to hijack the session after
user authentication has already occurred, e.g., via a Trojan on the untrusted
computer. Details of these two phases are described in the respective sections to
follow.
4.1 User Authentication
During the user authentication phase, it is assumed that the user has already
logged in to the mobile device and has opened the specific mobile application
(app), which implements the proposed scheme. The mobile app will have access
to the user’s secret private key, kpriv, which is kept in a secure location on the
mobile device. It is also assumed that given a user’s identity, the server can
obtain the user’s public key from a PKI. Fig. 1 presents an overview depicting
the flow of required events during the user authentication phase.
The steps required for user authentication are described as follows. Let
PKE.Enc(pk, ·) denote public key encryption4 of the parameter with public key
pk, and PKE.Dec(sk, ·) represent public key decryption of the parameter with
private key sk. In addition, let H be a collision free one-way hash function, and
OTP denote a one-time-password.
4 In practice, we need to employ a CCA-secure public key encryption as part of the
protocol.
Fig. 1. Overview of the user authentication phase.
1. User, U , enters URL into Browser, B, on an untrusted computer; B estab-
lishes an SSL connection with the Server, S.
2. U enters user identity, userID, into B; B sends userID to S.
3. S:
– uses userID to retrieve U ’s public key, kpub;
– computes two random numbers; namely, a random session key, ks, and
a random length, lotp, which will be used as the length of OTP;
– uses kpub to compute an authentication ciphertext, cauth, where cauth =
PKE.Enc(kpub, ks||lotp)
– encodes cauth into a QR code, QR(cauth);
– sends QR(cauth) to B.
4. B displays QR(cauth); U uses Mobile Device, M ; M :
– scans QR(cauth) and decodes it to obtain cauth;
– obtains ks and lotp using U ’s private key, kpriv, via PKE.Dec(kpriv, cauth);
– computes hotp = H(ks);
– converts hotp into base-64 representation;
– displays the first lotp base-64 characters of hotp to U . These characters
will be used as OTP.
5. U enters the OTP into B; B sends this to S.
6. S:
– computes h′otp = H(ks);
– converts the h′otp into base-64 representation;
– compares the first lotp base-64 characters of h
′
otp with OTP.
7. If the two character sequences match, then S authenticates U with userID.
4.2 Transaction Verification
After the user authentication phase, the user with userID would have been au-
thenticated. In addition, the mobile device and the server would have established
a session key, ks. Fig. 2 illustrates the steps required for transaction verification.
Fig. 2. Overview of the transaction verification steps.
The steps required for both the user and the server to verify the integrity of
a transaction are described as follows. Let SK.Enc(k, ·) and SK.Dec(k, ·) denote
symmetric key encryption and decryption, respectively, of the parameter with
key k. Furthermore, let H represent a collision free one-way hash function, and
TAN denote a transaction-authorization-number.
1. U confirms a transaction through B; B send the transaction data to S.
2. S:
– converts the transaction data into a summarized form, T ;
– computes
• two random numbers; namely, a random transaction key, kt, and a
random length, ltan, which will be used as the length of TAN;
• a transaction ciphertext, ct, using ks, where ct = SK.Enc(ks, kt||ltan);
• a hash of the transaction information, ht, where ht = H(T ||userID||ct);
– encodes T , ct and ht into a QR code, QR(T, ct, ht);
– sends QR(T, ct, ht) to B.
3. B displays QR(T, ct, ht); U uses M ; M :
– scans QR(T, ct, ht) and decodes it to obtain T , ct and ht;
– checks whether the QR code or the transaction information has been
tamper with by
• computing h′t = H(T ||userID||ct);
• If h′t = ht, this verifies that the transaction information was sent
from S, T has not been altered and the transaction was initiated by
U with userID
– obtains kt and ltan via SK.Dec(ks, ct);
– computes htan = H(T ||kt);
– converts htan into base-64 representation;
– displays the first ltan base-64 characters of htan to U . These characters
will be used as TAN.
4. M presents T to U ; U checks that the information in T is correct and au-
thorizes the transaction by entering the TAN into B; B sends this to S.
5. S:
– computes h′tan = H(T ||kt);
– converts the h′tan into base-64 representation;
– compares the first ltan base-64 characters of h
′
tan with TAN.
6. If the two character sequences match, the server verifies the integrity of T
and that U authorized T .
Note that the inclusion of userID in ht = H(T ||userID||ct) is to provide ad-
ditional assurance that the user initiated the transaction. It is not absolutely
necessary to include this in the hash. The same applies to the inclusion of T in
htan = H(T ||kt), which provides added assurance that the user authorizes trans-
action T . The scheme can function without the inclusion of either parameter.
5 Analysis and Discussion
5.1 Practical Issues
In view of the fact that the proposed approach uses PKI, this means that this
scheme can be used for multiple Internet services. Unlike private key approaches,
which requires each Internet service to establish a shared secret between the user
and the respective server, the PKI approach avoids practical issues concerning
the difficulty of pre-arranging shared secret keys. In addition, it is obvious that
the user authentication phase can easily be used in conjunction with a tradi-
tional username and password to produce a two factor authentication solution;
something that the user knows (i.e. the password) and something that the user
possesses (i.e. the mobile device).
In practice, a reasonable value for lotp and ltan should be between 6 to 8
characters. Ideally, for security purposes the full hash value should be transmit-
ted to the server. However, there is a trade-off between security and usability,
as it would be impractical to require the user to input more than 10 characters.
Therefore, we adopt a method similar to the approach in Starnberger [27] of con-
verting the hash value into an alphanumeric form and only requiring the user to
enter the first few characters. In our approach, we convert the hash value into
base-64 characters. The base-64 representation of a hash consists of upper and
lower case alphabets, the numbers 0-9, and two additional printable characters
that can be decided by the system. This will result in 64 possible values for a
character and each of them represents 6 bits of the hash.
5.2 User and Transaction Authentication
We show that without the active involvement of a legitimate user and the device,
an attacker who controls the untrusted computer cannot successfully imperson-
ate the user or perform an online transaction on behalf of the user.
Brute-force attack Let l be the OTP or TAN length (i.e. l can represent lotp
or ltan). Furthermore, let the values of l range between lmin and lmax. Hence the





and the probability of success of a random guess will be 1Nbf . If we consider the
simple (and less secure) setting where lmin = lmax = 8, then the probability
of success of a random guess is at most 1/248. As with most password/TAN
mechanisms, there should be a limit to the number of incorrect password/TAN
entry attempts, which can effectively defeat the brute-force attack.
Password Stealing and Replay attacks Unlike traditional username and
password login approaches which are vulnerable to password stealing attacks
like key-loggers, shoulder surfing, or replay attacks, our approach employs an
OTP method. Hence, any attempt to reuse the OTP will fail. In addition, unlike
other approaches like SMS approaches that require an active cellular or Internet
connection between the server and the mobile phone to transmit an OTP, in
our approach, the OTP is sent via the untrusted computer and communicated
to the mobile device through the visual channel. This approach also prevents
password phishing, because the user does not even know the password until
he/she initiates the user authentication phase.
To measure the success probability of a replay attack, first of all we should
note that both the session key, ks, and transaction key, kt, are single use keys
randomly chosen by the server in each session/transaction, which guarantees the
uniqueness of input to the hash function in each session/transaction. However,
since we use only the first few characters of the hash output as an OTP or TAN,
there is a chance of hash collision even when the hash inputs in two sessions are
different. According to the Birthday attack, for an OTP or TAN of length l (i.e.,
l base-64 characters or 6l bits), the chance (denoted by P (l, q)) of a collision
among q different sessions is bounded by




Man-in-the-Middle and Man-in-the-Browser Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
and Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) attacks can come in a variety of forms, for ex-
ample, phishing websites or Trojans on an untrusted computer. In an MitM
attack, an attacker may create a spoofed website and lure the user into using
this website, while relaying and attempting to modify messages between the user
and the actual transaction server. In MitB attacks, an attacker essentially hi-
jacks a session, and it has to be assumed that the attacker has full control of
the untrusted computer. These attacks are difficult to defend against because it
can happen after the user has already logged in and been authenticated by the
server. For the scheme proposed in this paper, MitM and MitB attacks are ad-
dressed in the transaction verification phase. In general, an attacker can perform
two malicious activities; in particular, an attacker can attempt to perform an
unauthorized transaction, or alter the transaction information sent to the server
and/or to the user.
To combat against such attacks, our approach requires important transac-
tions to be verified with a TAN. Our analysis in Sec. §5.2 has demonstrated that
the probability of success for an attacker to launch an unauthorized transaction
is negligible. If the attacker attempts to alter transaction information sent from
the server to the user, the computation of h′t = H(T ||userID||ct) on the mobile
device will be able to detect if changes were made to the transaction informa-
tion, T , as the resulting value will be different from ht. Similarly, if the attacker
attempts to alter transaction information sent from the user to the server, the
value of htan computed by the mobile device and the value of h
′
tan computed on
the server will be different with an overwhelming probability. It is worth noting
that here the chance of a collision is nearly negligible (close to 1/26ltan) since
the target T is fixed. Hence, transaction integrity is ensured as any attempt to
alter transaction information will be detected.
5.4 Drawbacks
The security of the proposed approach relies heavily on the availability and
integrity of a trusted mobile device. If the security of the mobile device is com-
promised and an attacker can steal the user’s private key or hijack the mobile
device, then the security of the proposed authentication and verification scheme
will be compromised. This also applies if the user loses the mobile device or if it
is stolen. Moreover, without the mobile device the user will not be able to use
Internet services that are based solely on this scheme.
The proposed approach also assumes the trustworthiness, integrity and secu-
rity of the PKI. It should be noted that if a PKI is by a user to secure multiple
Internet services, so that a mobile device is only required to store one private
key, the PKI will probably become the focus of attacks. Since once the security
of the PKI is breached, an attacker will be able to gain access to the multiple
Internet services employed by the user.
Another drawback of the scheme is that users might feel that it is tedious
to have use the mobile device to scan a QR code and to enter a TAN for im-
portant transactions, despite having already been logged in and authenticated
using the OTP. However, this may be a small price to pay to secure important
online transactions, such as banking activities and financial transfers. Also, while
our approach prevents MitM and MitB attacks from performing unauthorized
transactions or altering transaction information, it only prevents attacks against
transactions protected by the TAN. It does not defend against Denial-of-Service
attacks or eavesdropping attacks.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the problem of authentication and the verification of
online transactions performed on an untrusted computer or device. To address
this problem, we proposed a user authentication and transaction verification ap-
proach using QR codes and a trusted mobile device, equipped with a camera. Our
approach works via the visual channel and does not require an active connection.
In this paper, we analyze the security of our scheme and discuss the mechanisms
in the scheme for circumventing a variety of security threats including password
stealing, man-in-the-middle and man-in-the-browser attacks.
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